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WARNIHGI 
Decisions made by the courts of a province regardless of their level, 
are not binding on courts of another province. However, when a 
decision is to be made in regards to an issue where no precedent 
exists within the province, then indistinguishable rulings by courts 
of other provinces are influential, particularly when made by a Court 
of superior jurisdiction. Decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada 
are, of course, binding on all Courts in Canada. 
This system of law making by our judiciary is known as stare decisis. 
It simply means that once a Court has created a principle (for 
instance to be applied to a certain set of facts) it must consistently 
apply to all future cases where the circumstances or the law are not 
distinguishable. Our judges are ethically obligated to strive for a 
consistent and equitable application of the law regardless where in 
our nation one is being judged. For this reason rulings made by 
Courts in other provinces are pursuasi ve and ought to be followed 
unless a judge disagrees quite strongly with the correctness of these 
decisions. 
When a decision on an issue has been made, then, of course, it is a 
binding precedent on all the Courts in that province, inferior to the 
one in which the decision was made. 
This explanation is placed in this Volume as it contains synopses and 
explanations of reasons for judgment made by courts in provinces other 
than British Columbia. Most of those cases are selected because to 
the best of the author's knowledge, no binding precedent exists on 
that issue in B. C. 
* * * * * 
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FliUDUI.ENTLY USING A atEDIT CARD BEYOND 'DIE atEDIT LIHITS. 
IS THIS OBTAINING CREDIT,, GOODS AND HONEY BY FRADD? 
Re Hanes and The Queen. 69 C.C.C.(2d) 420 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
The accused, who had a credit line of $3,000 on a credit card, went on 
a financial binge and spent nearly $26,000 for goods and services in 
California. She was charged with having defrauded the credit company 
of money. She agreed that her actions were with the intent to defraud 
the credit company but argued that although that company is located in 
Ontario the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction of the 
Ontario Courts. Secondly, she argued that she obtained credit by 
fraud but that the credit company was not deprived of any money as was 
alleged. 
The defence had argued that the credit company had been deprived of 
credit and the Court agreed that the charge against the accused would 
also have been good if it had alleged fraudulent obtaining of credit. 
After having heard that funds were transferred to the financial insti-
tutions where the California merchants had deposited the credit slips 
the accused signed, the Court said: 
"Such payment of course , is not made in banknotes 
or coins, but is, I presume, made by the transfer 
of funds between the financial institutions using 
their instr\,lDlents for effecting such transfers. In 
my judgment, such payments constitute the payment 
of money within the meaning of section 338." 
In respect to the Court's jurisdiction, the Justice had plenty of law 
to refer to. It is widely accepted that where a person is charged 
with having committed acts at a location outside the Court's geo-
graphical jurisdiction, then if the harmful consequences are within 
that jurisdiction the person can be tried by that Court. 
In this case the credit company locate within the Court's jurisdiction 
was the victim of the accused's acts in that it was called upon and 
did make payments to the merchants. 
The accused had been committed for trial upon a preliminary hearing. 
These arguments were raised in the High Court of Justice in an attempt 
to have that committal quashed. 
Application to quash committal for trial 
was dismissed. 
* * * * * 
J.-
CHAR.TER O.F RIGHTS AND .FREEDOMS 
EXTRADITION LAWS - RIGHT OF A CITIZEN TO KEHA.IR IN CABADA 
The Matter of the Extradition Act and in the Matter of Gunther Voss -
B. C. Supreme Court. Vancouver May 1983. Registry No. CC821424. 
The State of Michigan, U.S.A. was seeking Voss' extradition. Voss is 
a Canadian citizen who allegedly committed fraud in Michigan. Voss 
claimed that section 6( 1) of the Charter supersedes anything the 
Extradition Act stipulates. The section guarantees Voss that he, 
being a citizen of Canada, "has the right to enter, remain in and 
leave Canada". No doubt, the Extradition Act places some limitations 
on the assurance of remaining at least. 
The Court brought section 1 of the Charter into the dispute. This 
section in essence says that the Courts must not go too far afield on 
these rights and freedoms, at least not on this side of the Pearly 
Gates. The entrenched enactment states that the rights and freedoms 
are guaranteed but "only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
Such a society may . well be heaven compared to those with different 
philosophies about governing, but it can only afford so much legal 
luxery. Therefore, the Court had to decide whether the provisions in 
the Extradition Act which were straining Voss' rights, were reasonable 
limitations on his right to stay home. 
The Court weighed Voss' argument and found it wanting. 
Court: 
"Were it otherwise, a Canadian could commit any 
crime with impunity as long as he committed it in 
somebody else's country" and 
"Being subject to extradition, then, is a reason-
able limitation of the citizen's right to remain in 
Canada". 
* * * * * 
Said the 
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CREATING A DISTURBANCE 
DISTURBING PERSONS IN A DWELLING HOUSE 
Regina v. Woniandy - Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench August 1982 
(No. 19) 
The accused had a problem with her 14 year old son about where he was 
to spend the evening. The accused "was under the influence of 
alcohol" at the time. The boy sought refuge at his grandparents' 
place. The accused followed her son there and a scolding and argument 
resulted in the boy receiving a bloody nose. 
Two hours later the accused came around again to retrieve her son. 
She banged on the door, screamed and shouted. The occupants of the 
house were genuinly afraid of the accused and phoned the police. The 
accused was arrested and tried for creating a disturbance (section 
17l(l)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code). The trial judge found that there 
was indeed a disturbance but because the only people disturbed were in 
a dwelling house he acquitted the accused. 
The Justice of the Queen's Bench (Saskatchewan counterpart of the 
Supreme Court in B.C.) held: 
1. The offence cannot be committed by a person in a dwelling house; 
2. The offence can be committed near a public place; 
3. The offence can only be committed if there is a disturbance 
caused in the four ways the section stipulates; and 
4. It does not matter if the persons disturbed are in a private or 
public place. 
Therefore the trial judge had erred in law. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Accused convicted. 
* * * * * 
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IMPATIENT CUSTOMER DRIVING OFF WITHOUT PAYING FOR GASOLIRE 
THKFT? 
Regina v. Badger Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench October 1982 
The accused told the service station attendant to "fill it up". The 
attendant put the nozzle in the tank and set it so it filled the gas 
tank of the accused's car automatically. When the tank was full the 
attendant was busy with other matters and although he heard the 
accused honk his horn several times , he did not go out until he was 
finished with whatever he was doing only to find that the accused had 
left and that $17.50 of fuel had been transferred 
The attendant's version of what happened and that of the accused 
jibed. When questioned the accused said he was in a hurry to attent 
"a feast" and as there appeared little interest on the part of the 
attendant to complete the transaction he had left. The accused was 
acquitted on a charge of theft and the Crown appealed. 
The trial judge had held that the accused in the circumstances became, 
in fact, the legitimate owner of the gasoline when it was pumped in 
his car. "Once appropriated it may well be that the property in the 
gasoline passes to the purchaser, leaving the vendor with a contract-
ual right to receive the purchasing price" had the trial judge said. 
The appeal court Justice did not disagree with this opinion. 
Crown's Appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
Comment: This is a case that dangles in between theft and "theft by 
trick". The latter includes fraud and false pretences. The basic 
distinction between these two is that in the case of theft the owner 
did not wish to part with the property where in theft by trick he 
does. The owner, in the case of fraud or false pretences is simply 
tricked by some misrepresentation in ability or intent to pay to part 
with his property. 
The way the trial judge had reasoned it seems not unlikely that he 
would have convicted the accused if a charge of false pretence had 
been preferred. 
* * * * * 
6 
AlTEMPTED THEFT 
DESCRIPTION OF ITEMS ACCUSED IRTIOO>KD TO STEAL 
Between Attorney General of B.C. petitioner and His Honour Judge 
Cronin, Provincial Court Judge and Henry McBryan 
McBryan was charged that he "did attempt to steal something from a 
motor vehicle bearing B. C. Licence II " Defence objected 
to proceed on that charge claiming that- it -contained insufficient 
details of what he was to meet. Apparently the accused did not say 
why he did break into the car but it was inferred that he did so to 
steal something from its content or a part of the car. The Provincial 
Court Judge was persuaded and refused to proceed. 
The Crown applied to the Supreme Court for an order directing Judge 
Cronin to proceed with the trial (an order of mandamus). 
The Supreme Court Justice held that the Crown is not obliged to allege 
specifically what it was the accused tried to steal. 
Provincial Judge ordered to proceed. 
* * * * * 
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PERSONATION 
GIVING FICTITIOUS KAME TO POLICE TO AVOID EXECUTION OF WARRANT 
Regina v. Northrup 41 N.B.R. (2d) 610 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
The accused was arrested for the commission of an offence and gave 
police a fictitious name. He knew there were Canada wide warrants 
outstanding for his arrest and he wanted to avoid those documents from 
being executed. 
When police checked his fingerprints the next day they discovered the 
accused's true identity. Consequently, the accused was convicted 
under section 361(a) of the Criminal Code which states that: 
"Every one who fraudulently personates any person, 
living or dead, with the intent to gain advantage 
for himself or another person, is guilty of an 
indictable offence". 
The accused appealed the conviction. 
Firstly the name used by the accused was randomly selected. There may 
well be a person by that name, living or dead, but that was meaning-
less to the accused or the circumstances. 
Section 361 refers to a "person" and that is either a natural or a 
legal person (corporate entity). A person is therefore a real person, 
not a fictitious one. If, for instance, Joe Blotch is entitled to a 
benefit and someone else presents himself as Joe Blotch to reap those 
benefits, then that person committed the fraudulent personation the 
section speaks of. In this case the accused's efforts were in pseudo-
nymity and not in personation. Furthermore, section 361 is under Part 
VIII of the Criminal Code which addresses itself to "fraudulent trans-
actions relating to contracts". This implies that the personation 
must be fraudulent and for the purpose of gaining proprietary rights 
or avoid contractual obligations or liabilities. 
Appeal allowed. 
Acquittal ordered. 
* * * * * 
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IRJURING A DOG 
POLICE DOG INJURED BY A FLEEING SUSPECT 
Regina v. Barr 1 C.C.C. (3d) 47 
Provincial Court of Alberta 
In the early morning hours police saw two men fleeing from the rear of 
a building. As commands to stop were of no avail the first constable 
on the scene sent his dog after the accused. After the accused failed 
to stop when told "stop, police", the command "take him" was given to 
the dog. The accused who carried a 2.5 ft. crowbar turned and struck 
the dog on the shoulder and when the animal backed off and yelped he 
struck it again. Although the dog continued to limp after the accused 
it cowered away every time the accused raised the crow bar. Another 
dog arrived at the scene. The accused attempted to strike it too but 
missed. The dog grabbed the accused by the arm, the crow bar dropped 
and the accused was apprehended. 
Subsequent to these events it was discovered that the building the 
accused was seen coming from had been broken into. The other man who 
had been apprehended also, implicated the accused, and pleaded guilty 
to "break and enter". (The dog had recovered from flesh wounds in the 
shoulder area). 
The accused maintained that he was high on alcohol and valium at the 
time. All he could remember he told the Court when being tried for 
injuring an animal, was that he was bitten by a dog and that he had 
swung at it to stop it from hurting him. 
The charge against the accused was under section 40l(a) of the 
Criminal Code which prohibits the injuring, killing, maiming, wounding 
or poisoning of dogs, birds or animals that are not cattle and which 
are kept for a lawful purpose. Section 386(2) provides that no one 
can be convicted of the above offence where he proves that he acted 
with legal justification or excuse and with colour of right. The 
accused claimed that the force used by police via the dogs was exces-
sive and that he was at least justified in defending himself as he 
did. 
In addition, the accused raised the defence of self defence. The 
Court immediately rejected that suggestion and held that sections 34 
to 37 speak of defending oneself from an "assailant". This implies 
that your assailant must be a person. 
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The Court also rejected a submission by the Crown that a policeman and 
his dog should be seen as one unit; and that the dog was assisting the 
officer. Although the proposal was attractive, it simply had no 
countenance in law. The dog was the "property" of the City which 
employed the officer (a mischief charge would be possible) and it was 
a weapon of the policeman the same as his gun or any other weapon. It 
then follows that if the dog attacks or apprehends a suspect in a 
manner that is excessive in the circumstances then the officer is 
criminally liable. If, however, the application of force is lawful 
and it is not excessive, then when the suspect injures the dog in 
warding off the attack, or making good his escape, then section 386(2) 
C. C. contains nothing that is of comfort to him. In other words the 
police dog is protected by section 40l(a) C.C. only if its master acts 
in accordance to law. 
To determine if the officer so acted it had to be found that he had 
the power to arrest the accused in the circumstances and that the 
force used to effect that lawful arrest was not excessive. 
The desire on the part of police to speak to someone they find in 
certain circumstances does by itself not justify the making of an 
arrest unless the circumstances which give rise to that desire, amount 
to more than suspicion, and in fact add up to the reasonable and 
probable grounds prerequisite to a lawful arrest. 
In this case there were ample grounds to justify the arrest 
The dog, "very large and with big teeth" was sent to fetch the 
accused. It was like the cat plays with the mouse: "You won't get 
away from me, one swipe of my paw and I' 11 have you". The question is 
whether the running away from a scene such as this justified the big 
teeth, the biting etc. Could the constable not have overtaken the 
accused himself? 
The Provincial Court Judge replied that the accused should have 
thought of the large dog and the big teeth before he ran. He knew the 
officer and the dog were there; he turned when the command to attack 
was given and delivered the blow for which he was put on trial. He 
knew the risk and he exposed himself to all the things that he now 
claims amount to excessive force. In short, the force used with a 
trained dog which does not chew after stopping the suspect and will 
release his charge when there is no resistance is simply not excessive 
in the circumstances as they presented themselves 
Accused convicted. 
* * * * * 
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PROVING A PREVIOUS CONVICTON 
CERTIFIED EXTRACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE RECORDS TO PROVE PREVIOUS CR.IMIHAL 
DRIVING OFFENCE 
Regina v. Williams County Court of Vancouver Island Duncan Registry 
No. 05878 
The accused was convicted of a drinking/driving offence and the Crown 
sought a greater penalty due to a previous conviction the accused did 
not admit to. To prove the previous conviction the Crown tendered a 
certified extract issued under section 75 of the B. C. Motor Vehicle 
Act instead of using provisions under the Criminal Code (sections 740 
and 594) for this purpose. The trial judge refused to accept the 
extract and sentenced the accused as though this was his first 
offence. The Crown appealed. 
The County Court Judge held firstly that the extract is proof of its 
content and not merely proof that a record exists. Then on the issue 
whether the extract is only such proof in cases where provincial 
offences are tried the Court reviewed a number of cases and drew the 
attention to section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act which states that 
in proceedings involving Federal law the laws of evidence in the 
province in which the proceedings take place apply. Just because 
there are alternate means (Criminal Code provisions) to prove the 
previous conviction, that does not mean that methods provided by 
provincial law do not apply. 
Appeal allowed. 
Referred back to Provincial Court for 
Sentencing. 
* * * * * 
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Dll.IVING WHILE Dll.IVER'S LICENCE SUSPENDED 
KOTOlt VEHICLE ACT - DEFENCE OP' LACK OP' nmnrt' 
Regina v. Jack B. C. Supreme Court. No. CR 83023 Kelowna Registry 
The accused was convicted of impaired driving and his driver's licence 
was automatically suspended by the B. C. Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles. Prior to reinstatement the accused was found driving and 
charged under section 94.1 of the Motor Vehicle Act, as it then was in 
June of 1982 
The Crown did not adduce any evidence at trial to show that the 
accused had any knowledgtt that his licence was suspended. This 
caused the Provincial Court Judge to dismiss the information. The 
Crown appealed the dismissal by stated case. 
The Court observed that the section under which the accused was 
charged and the way Section 94 M. V .A. reads now (since September of 
1982) is, for the purposes of the question raised here (is mens rea a 
prerequisite to conviction?), essentially the same in conten~ -
The reason why the Provincial Court Judge dismissed the information 
last Af ril is in all likelihood the decision the B. C. Court of 
Appeal made the month before when it, by reference, was asked if 
section 94(3) M.V.A. was constitutionally kosher. The subsection 
states (and stated under the old section) that the offence of driving 
while under suspension is an offence of "absolute liability". This 
means that knowledge on the part of the accused is not an essential 
ingredient to the offence, and all the Crown has to prove is that the 
licence was suspended and that the accused drove. This the Court of 
Appeal held is contrary to section 7 of the Charter of Rights and 
subsection (3) was invalidated. 
However, a Nova Scotia case of driving while under suspension reached 
the Supreme Court of Canada recently2. The Motor Vehicle Act of that 
Province does not identify the liability category. If the Court holds 
or the law dictates that an offence is a mens rea of fence it has to be 
proven that there was intent on the part ofthe accused, which of 
course includes knowledge. It can also declare it to be a strict 
liability offence (as most offences under provincial statutes are) 
which means that when the Crown proved that the driver's licence was 
suspended when the accused drove his car, the accused would be 
convicted unless he shows "mistake of fact" (a mistaken belief in a 
set of facts that if they had existed would render the accused 
innocent). 
1 B. C. Court of Appeal CA #821013. See page 22 of Volume 11 of this 
publication. 
2 R. v. MacDougall (1983) 1 C.C.C. (3d) 65 
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The Supreme Court of Canada held that driving while under suspensio~ 
is an offence concerning the public welfare and held that it therefore 
is an offence of strict liability. 
The B. c. Court of Appeal held that absolute liability for this 
offence is contrary to the Charter of Rights and it invalidated the 
subsection that made it so. That means that section 94 M.V.A. is now 
like the section in the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act where the Courts 
must identify the liability catagory for the offence. In view of what 
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled, the B. c. "Driving while under 
suspension" offence is a strict liability offence also, held this B. 
C. Supreme Court Justice. Therefore the Provincial Court Judge erred 
in law when he held that knowledge of the suspension had to be proved 
to convict. 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Case referred back to Provincial Court. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER. OF RIGHTS & FREEDOMS 
IDENTIFICATION OF auKINALS N.:f. -
RETURN OF RECORDS TO ACQUITTED PERSON 
LaPlante v. Attorney General of Quebec 31 C.R.(3) 94. 
Quebec Superior Court 
LaPlante was acquitted of a criminal charge and applied to the Supreme 
Courts to have all records turned over to him that pertained to his 
identification. 
The Superior Court granted the order holding that the very title of 
the Identification of Criminals Act reveals parliament's intent. It 
is to identify criminal and not innocent persons. To leave LaPlante's 
records with police would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter of 
Rights, said the Court. 
* * * * * 
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HYPNOSIS AS AN INVESTIGATIVE AID 
To use hypnosis to refresh the memory of persons who have likely 
valuable information stored somewhere in that human memory bank is 
something many personnel in the criminal justice system find somewhat 
questionable. It is like bringing some sort of witch craft into the 
traditional and conservative Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. Common 
sense tells us that this sort of sorcery-like methods are not accept-
able in our Courts. Closer examination produces reasons that support 
these first-blush opinions. A witness who testifies to what was 
previously remembered by him through hypnosis is likely telling what 
was suggested to him and cannot vouch for the truth of his evidence. 
At one time he could not remember but after someone fooled around with 
his mind while it was in a state susceptible to suggestions, he 
recalls the minutest details. It seems unlikely that even if such 
"hypnotically developed testimony" is admitted in evidence the judge 
of the facts will lend much credence to it. If the witness was the 
victim of a crime that created trauma, anxiety and mental stress, it 
could well be that the failure to remember is nature's way of making 
that person cope with that trauma. Inasmuch as unconsciousness is a 
natural anesthetic for physical pain, so is repression of memory a 
psychological anesthetic for mental agony. If hypnosis can make that 
person remember, recalling the details may cause the memory to be 
tainted with the anxiety the event caused. 
A bad Canadian experience with a person questioned while in an 
hypnotic state3 caused our highest Court to say that there was not a 
greater trespass on and invasion of privacy than to gain unconsented 
access to that which is the utmost of privacy of any individual, the 
mind. Of course, Horvath was a suspect and not a witness. The highly 
skilled interrogator who received the Court's praise, had inadvertent-
ly caused the semi-hypnotic state by his psychological superiority 
over the 17 year old Horvath. 
This has caused a misguided belief that any investigator who is a 
trained police hypnotist will be rendered ineligible to question 
suspects. It is thought that his credibility will suffer as his skill 
will cause inadvertent or possibly advertent hypnotic states of mind 
on the part of the suspect. 
3 Horvath v. The Queen 3 W.W.R. 1979 1. Supreme Court of Canada. See 
also page 22 of Volume 7 of this publication. 
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It is also questioned, what police investigators are doing probing 
the human mind. Physical as well as psychological reactions are 
possible. They are not trained to make a prognosis nor · are they 
competent to render any form of treatment when reactions occur. The 
liability for lasting consequences could be enormous. 
These and many other sincere observations have caused an apparently 
valid resistance to this new concept in forensic science. If not 
resistance, then at least there is a sphere of suspicion about this 
practice that seems so out of character with and so "hocus-pocus" in 
our stuffy juristics. 
These are all good reasons to be cautious but not necessarily to be 
cynical or even skeptical. The history of hypnotically developed 
testimony is very recent in Canada but not so in the United States and 
practically all are related to witnesses and not accused persons. In 
Canada there are in essence two recorded cases. The first was R. v. 
K4 and the second R. v. Zubot5. 
In R. v. K. the Court would not allow the testimony which was 
developed by hypnosis. The Court thought it too risky as (1) the 
police may have influenced the witness; (2) hypnosis does not guaran-
tee that a witness speaks the truth; (3) it is an uncontrolled science 
etc. 
In the second case the Crown did much better and a land mark decision 
was made by the Justice of this superior Court. It was argued that 
nothing guarantees that the truth is spoken by witnesses. Their minds 
have been contaminated by the media, by what they heard from others, 
and suggestions by police or by other persons influential on the 
witness, however veil, have an effect. Therefore, argued the Crown, 
the hypnosis is no more than refreshing the mind like reading notes 
made when the mind still remembered the details. In any event the 
Alberta Queen's Bench held in regards to testimony developed under 
hypnosis the question is not one of admissibility but credibiity. 
In the United States, a lot more cases involving hypnosis have been 
decided on over the last 20 years. It seems that that nation's judic-
iary is also proceeding in this new field with the greatest of 
caution. Their experience includes hypnosis of the accused. In the 
early part of this century the Court refused to even recognize hypno-
tism as a science. Fifty years later when an accused, in his defence 
testified as to what he remembered since being hypnotised, the evi-
dence was admitted. 
4 R. v. K. (Juvenile). (1979 10 C.R. (3d) 235 Manitoba Provincial 
Court 
5 R. v. Zubot Alberta Queen's Bench, Not Yet Reported 
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In respect to witnesses the U. S. Courts have allowed not only evi~ 
dence developed by hypnosis but also hypnotically adduced evidence. 
The latter means that the witness testified while in a hypnotic state. 
Although many legal and other questions have to be answered yet in 
regards to hypnosis as part of the forensic sciences, that should not 
mean that we should shy away from it. Firstly, it does not seem 
advisable to practice the · 'art' on a suspect regardless whether he 
consents. Although there are circumstances where this may be 
appropriate and could result in the evidence obtained thereby to be 
admissible. However, in probably 99% of such cases the defence should 
experiment with hypnotic developed or adduced evidence. 
Hypnotic developed evidence of a witness requires many safeguards and 
where the witness is the victim of the crime alleged, extra caution 
is required. 
In all circumstances, it should probably be used as a last resort; 
only in cases where essential details are expected to be locked in or 
repressed by the mind of a witness. 
To avoid the inevitable submission that the hypnotist gave post 
hypnotic suggestions to the witness he (the hypnotist) should be as 
ignorant of the details of the crime as possible. 
Then there are all the policies that should be in place to avoid civil 
liabilities. 
The argument that a trained police hypnotist is less credible when 
questioning suspects under normal circumstances because an inadvertent 
hypnotic state of mind may accrue, seems invalid. It. seems that an 
inadvertent hypnotic state of mind is more likely to result when the 
interrogator is not a trained hypnotist. 
Another matter to be remembered is that "subsequent facts" will 
inevitably strengthen the credibility of the witness. For instance, 
where a witness cannot remember a location where certain items were 
seen, and with hypnosis the location is discovered and the items 
are found. In many cases what is discovered by hypnosis corroborates 
other testimony of the witness 
It seems that the police must not shy away from using this method in 
their fact finding missions. However, we mus.t be very aware of the 
limitations of using hypnosis and of evidentiary and other legal 
complexities 
* * * * * 
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CllARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOHS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL - WARNING 
Regina v. Nelson 3 C.C.C. (3d) 147 
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench 
Police attended at the scene of a shooting where the accused made some 
incriminating statements. He was arrested for attempted murder and 
told that he could call a lawyer if he wished when they got to a tele-
phone. After having been at the police station for three hours the 
accused was informed that the victim had died and that he was now 
charged with murder. He was also told: "I must also advise you that 
you can call a lawyer to instruct and receive advice from". When 
asked if he understood, the accused said: "Yup, yup" upon which the 
questioning immediately began. This resulted in a confession the 
admissibility of which was opposed by defence counsel for non compli-
ance with the Charter of Rights. 
The Justice of the Queen's Bench allowed in evidence the statements 
the accused made at the scene, but ruled the confession made after 
being charged with murder inadmissible. This he did on the following 
grounds: 
1. The wording used to inform the accused of his rights was inade-
quate to convey to him the rights he had under section 10 of the 
Charter; 
2. When the rights have been given, particularly to an uneducated 
person, then the authorities must wait for a waiver to that right 
before they question the accused (he either says "Yes" and be 
given a phone or says "No" which is the equivalent to a waiver of 
the rights); 
3. "Yup, yup" was, in the circumstances, inadequate to show the 
accused understood what his right was; and 
4. A fair minded member of society, if he viewed the circumstances 
would consider the administration of justice to have been brought 
into disrepute if the statement was allowed in evidence on the 
basis that the accused knew his rights and had a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise them. 
Statement ruled inadmissible 
* * * * * 
Regina v. Bell 
06555 
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OPINION EVIDENCE 
County Court of Vancouver Island Duncan Registry 
". • • I formed the opinion that not only was he 
impaired, he was, in fact, drunk at the time I was 
speaking with him". 
This is what a 15 year police veteran, who figured he had dealt with 
at least one thousand impaired drivers, testified to during the 
accused's trial for impaired driving. This testimony was the only 
evidence in the case that had impressed the Provincial Court Judge. 
The other Crown evidence was of little or no value and the Judge had 
said that he would have no hesitation to acquit the accused if it was 
not for the officer's opinion evidence of the accused's condition at 
the "incident scene". 
The accused, when arguing his appeal, reminded the County Court Judge 
of reasons for judgment handed down in December of 1982 by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of Gratt v. The Queen. The case predomin-
antly dealt with 'opinion evidence' and responded to a complaint that 
Courts are inclined to let such evidence by police officers overwhelm 
that of other witnesses. 
The Supreme Court said in response: 
"... the fact that a police witness has seen more 
impaired drivers than a non-police witness is not a 
reason in itself to prefer the evidence of the 
police officer" and 
"Trial judges should bear in mind that this is 
non-expert opinion evidence and that the opinion of 
police officers is not entitled to preference just 
because they may have extensive experience with 
impaired drivers". 
It is always believed that frequency of exposure to impaired and 
intoxicated persons leads to a level of expertise that makes a police 
officer eventually an expert who is allowed to give opinion evidence. 
The Supreme Court of Canada reminded that there are two exceptions to 
the hearsay rule that permit the admission of opinion evidence; expert 
testimony and "compendious statements of facts". The latter is really 
an expression which is a short and accepted statement of a combination 
of facts. 
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When someone observes a number of symptoms he combines them and in a 
case such as this they result in an opinion that a person is impaired 
or intoxicated. That opinion is based on a common exposure we all 
have in society. Chances are pretty good that the person is intoxi-
cated but whether or not he is in fact, requires the opinion of an 
expert. The Supreme Court of Canada said that police opinions on 
intoxication are, in most cases, admissible not because they are 
experts (regardless of exposure) but because they make "a compendious! 
statement of facts", something most witnesses are permitted to do in 
testimony. That is what caused the Supreme Court to caution that the 
testimony of one lay witness should not necessarily overwhelm the 
testimony of another. 
Must exposure then, not be taken in consideration when assessing the 
value of ,such "compendious statement of facts"? Said the Supreme 
Court of Canada: 
"The weight of the evidence is entirely a matter 
for the Judge or Judge and Jury. The value of 
opinion will depend on the view the court takes in 
all the circumstances" and 
"If the witness lacks the relevant experience, or 
is otherwise limited in his testimonial capacity, 
or if the witness is not sure • • • this can be 
brought out in cross examination". 
Although the Gnatt judgment is very interesting and may correct a 
misconception many have about police being "expert witnesses" in the 
matter of intoxication, it did not assist this accused Bell. 
There were no defence witnesses who gave opinions which were over-
whelmed by that of the officer. In other words there was no 
conflict. The Provincial Court Judge had considered the weight of the 
"compendious statement of facts" given by the experienced officer. 
It, coupled with "the minor observations" given by others, convinced 
him beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was 
impaired by alcohol. 
1 Comes from 
synopsis of 
knowledge. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
the word "compendium" which means a summary or 
facts which is only part of a larger field of 
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CHARTER. OF RIGHTS 
SELF CRIMINATION - CROSS EXAMINATION 
ON TESTIMONY GIVEN DURING A VOIR. DIRE. 
Regina v. Jewitt 3 C.C.C. (3d) 191 
County Court Vancouver, B. C. 
The Charter of Rights states that incriminating evidence may not be 
used against the witness who gave that evidence in testimony in other 
proceedings safe for the purpose of proving perjury. Innovative 
counsel suggested to the County Court Judge that the Crown was not 
entitled to cross-examine the accused during the main trial (before a 
jury) on what he had testified to during a voir dire. He claimed the 
trial and the voir dire to be separate proceedings for this purpose. 
Said the Court in rejecting defence counsel's submission: 
"For if that avenue is not available then it seems 
to me the accused will be permitted with impunity 
to tell one story at one stage of the proceedings 
and a different story at another stage of the 
proceedings". 
* * * * * 
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REFUSAL - KIGHT TO COUNSEL - CBAllTER. OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
R. v. Stowe County Court of Vancouver No. CC821358 Vancouver Registry 
July 22, 1983 
The accused was brought to the police station under demand to provide 
samples of breath. In the interview room he said to the constable: 
"Dial Information and get Bolton's number". This did not mean 
anything to the officer and he continued with his investigation. The 
accused made four sham attempts to give samples and was then told he 
had "refused to blow". Moments later, outside the breathalyzer room 
the accused said, "I' 11 go back and I' 11 blow". The answer was : "You 
are too late". 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that he had not been 
given the opportunity to contact counsel and secondly that his offer 
to go back and blow negated his refusal. 
The County Court Judge held that the offer to blow was not part of the 
ongoing transactions with the breathalyzer operator and the sham 
attempts. 
"Sooner or later the police have the right to con-
clude that a reasonable and fair opportunity has 
been provided and a refusal made. I find that to 
have occurred here". 
The question remaining was whether the accused had been deprived of 
his right to counsel. Although "Mr. Bolton" did not mean anything to 
the officer, it must have been clear that in the circumstances the 
accused found himself in "it is not likely he wanted to call his 
dentist or his barber". The officer should have cleared it up what 
the accused wanted. The accused was refused access to counsel. 
However, did he in the circumstances have a right to counsel? Was he 
by simply being under demand detained or arrested? 
The officer had not arrested the accused but stated on the stand that 
he had taken the accused "into custody". And when asked in cross-
examination: "But as far as you are concerned he was "detained" for a 
possible charge of impaired driving?", the officer answered: "Yes". 
The Court found the accused was detained and was denied his right to 
counsel. 
Accused Acquitted 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Regina v. Trudeau and Tait, Vancouver County Court, Vancouver Registry 
C.C. 821730, April 1983 
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that we will not be 
deprived of life, liberty or the security of the person other than in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. It also 
assures us to be considered innocent until we are proven guilty. The 
two accused were charged with possession of a stolen car and the Crown 
adduced evidence during the trial that the accused were within the 
previous five years convicted of theft or possession of stolen proper-
ty. Section 318 of the Criminal Code provides for the admissibility 
of such evidence to assist in proving that the accused had knowledge 
that the car they had in their possession was in fact stolen. On the 
grounds of the above mentioned provisions of the Charter the accused 
claimed that section 318 C.C. is unconstitutional. 
The County Court Judge held that section 318 c.c. does not offend the 
Charter in respect to the presumption of innocence. He said that the 
section only provides something that may be considered by the judge of 
the facts but does not remove the burden of proving what is alleged 
beyond a reasonable doubt from the Crown. 
However, the Court held that section 318 C.C. did not align itself 
with the principles of fundamental justice. For instance, if a person 
had shoplifted something less than five years ago what probative value 
could such evidence have to say that it is now fair to find because of 
that conviction that the accused had knowledge that the car he drove 
was stolen. He thought it to be extremely difficult for instance, to 
instruct a jury on what weight they could and should give to evidence 
of a previous conviction to determine if he is guilty in this 
instance. For these reasons the judge could not but conclude that the 
application of the section would be prejudicial and unfair to an 
accused. Therefore, it (section 318 C.C.) is not consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
Section struck down 
Evidence of previous conviction not allowed 
Comment: It is not unreasonable that the section was found out of 
step with the Charter or even with our principles of fairness prior to 
it becoming effective. However, it seems that section 318 C.C. would 
be struck down for reasons other than those given in the case. Surely 
we must assume that our juries or judges when they sit alone can 
fairly assess the relevance and weight of a previous conviction. If a 
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bottle of after shave lotion was taken from the drug store at the age 
of seventeen as a free birthday gift for grandpa, and at the age of 
twenty-two, the perpetrator of that crime . is found in possession of 
the stolen Crown jewels, the worst than can happen is for a jury to 
think that he started young and small and progressed quickly in the 
world of crime. Judges in their addresses to juries do explain the 
law and point out what by the rules of law is capable of being a fact, 
then the jury decides whether or not it is. That includes a direction 
if the aggregate of the evidentiary value of what they by law may 
include in their deliberations, amounts to proof of a fact. If the 
previous conviction adduced by the Crown is frivolous in respect to 
the case to be proven, surely the judge can tell the jury so as he 
does with all the other evidence the jury has to consider. 
It would seem more reasonable to fail this obscure and odd "presump-
tion of guilty knowledge" on different grounds. Even where "similar 
fact" evidence is admissible the theory "he has done it before, there-
fore he did it again" is taboo. It is only to show similarity in the 
means by which the crime was committed. Why should in a case like 
this the proof of a guilty mind be established by showing that the 
accused committed the crime before? Why is there no such provision 
for all offences where knowledge and ~ ~ is a prerequisite to 
conviction? 
Secondly, since the section is, in a way, a presumption of guilt, it 
could have been tested for excessiveness against the Charter's guaran-
tee to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Courts of superior 
jurisdiction have devised a test to do so. If the fact that may be 
presumed (care or control section 23); knowledge of inadequate funds 
being on deposit, s. 320(4); knowledge if serial number obliterated, 
s. 332, etc.) is not a probable consequence of the facts to be proved 
for the presumption to arise, then the provision in law for that 
presumption is excessive. Perhaps section 318 c.c. could have 
survived if a voir dire was ordered to be conducted if the previous 
conviction and its circumstances were reasonable facts to take into 
consideration to determine if the accused on this occasion had guilty 
knowledge. In other words, to determine if in each case it is fair 
and therefore in compliance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
Recently, the presumption of "care or control" was unfairly applied. 
When the case reached the B. C. Court of Appeal, *it did not invali-
date the statutory provision for the presumption but simply held that 
in the circumstances, it did not apply. 
* * * * * 
* February 1983. Toews v. The Queen CA 801099 
11 of this publication. 
See page 29 of Volume 
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ALLOWING VICIOUS DOGS TO BB AT I.AR.GE 
CRIMINAL :NEGLIGENCE CAUSING BODILY HAKH 
Regina v. Manfred and Vera Mayerhofer, County Court of Yale, Kelowna 
No. CR 81/82 - May 1983 
The accused jointly owned two Rottweiler dogs. They were kept in a 
very inadequate enclosure from which they .often escaped. Both accused 
knew that the dogs were, to say the least, vicious. Mr. Mayerhofer 
had referred to the dogs as "mean bastards" and was quite proud of the 
fact that one of them had killed a cow. Mrs. Mayerhofer had made 
similar claims about the dogs' propensities. 
One day the dogs attacked another dog being walked by its owner, a 
neighbour of the accused. The Rottweilers had escaped from their pen 
by jumping up against the gate when they spotted the neighbor's dog. 
The Rottweilers injured the dog badly before being called off by the 
accused. When the neighbor offered to fix the locking device on the 
pen to prevent this from happening again, the gesture was rejected by 
Mrs. Mayerhofer who was of the opinion that nothing needed to be done 
about her dogs. 
Two days later the dogs attacked an eight year old boy. The 
physician's description of the injuries is capable of causing nausea. 
Among the severe injuries were torn off scalp, a torn eye lid, and a 
chewed off arm; • • • "the lower part of this arm remained hanging by 
mangled strands of muscle". 
An hour after this incident the dogs attacked a woman and her son 
right in front of the accused's home. Severe injuries and torn flesh 
right down to the bone were the results. 
As a consequence of these attacks the accused were charged with 
criminal negligence causing bodily harm (section 204 of the Criminal 
Code). 
To be successful in a prosecution of this kind (as well as in a liti-
gation for damages) when the animal is domesticated, there must be 
proof that there was knowledge on the part of the accused that hiis 
animal was predisposed "to do this particular kind of mischief". In 
this case the Crown had to prove the accused knew the dogs to be 
vicious. There was ample evidence for such proof, including scars on 
Mr. Mayerhofer's arm, which he claimed were caused by his own dogs. 
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There must also be proof of an ommission of duty on the part of the 
accused. This duty must be a duty imposed by law. A by-law to show a 
duty to ensure that one's dog is not at large, is helpful. However, 
"there is a common law duty that makes a person liable for any damage 
caused by keeping an animal which he knows has a propensity to do a 
particular kind of mischief". 
The dogs were vicious and the accused knew it; the accused were heed-
less and therefore reckless; they had treated the matter of the 
dangerous animals they harbored as though it was not anything of 
importance and, therefore had a disregard for the lives and safety of 
others. 
Accused convicted 
The case that was apparently most helpful to the Judge was Regina v. 
Petzoldt* which was decided by a County Court Judge in Ontario. 
Petzoldt was an animal trainer who kept two large chimpanzees in his 
basement. One day he took one of them for a walk on a leash. The 200 
lbs., 5 foot high animal grabbed an 8 year old girl and bit her on the 
head and shoulders doing her bodily harm which required considerable 
medical attention. 
Petzoldt knew the chimp was dangerous. On a previous occasion when a 
police officer attended to a complaint of the ape having scratched a 
child he told the officer that if he came too close the animal would 
attack and possibly kill him. These and several other incidents were 
sufficient proof of knowledge that the animals were vicious. An 
expert on the behaviour of these animals (a curator of a zoo) said 
that the chimpanzee is a wild animal by nature. They belong to a 
category of "beasts" known as farae naturae. The Judge noted from a 
history of cases on the issue that the owner can be civilly liable 
without having particular knowledge that such undomesticated animal 
was dispositioned to be vicious. In the case of a domesticated 
animal, the owner must have knowledge of the propensities of the 
animal before he can be held civilly liable. To be criminally liable 
such knowledge on the part of the accused must be shown whether the 
animal is domesticated or otherwise. In addition, the accused's 
action must be advertent and heedful. 
Petzoldt was also found guilty of criminal negligence causing bodily 
harm. 
* * * * * 
* 11 c.c. (2d) 320. 
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CHAR.TEX. OF RIGHTS ARD mEEDOMS 
SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT - UNREASONABLE SKAllCH 
- EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Regina v. Phillips (alias Ward) - The County Court of Vancouver No. 
C.C. 830603 August 1983 
Seven police officers attended at a private residence to search for a 
party they wanted to question in regards to two armed robberies. 
Police had reasonable and probable grounds for believing the suspect 
was in the home but they had no such grounds for believing that he had 
committed the robberies. The Crown conceded that police had suspic-
ions but lacked the requisite grounds to obtain a warrant for the 
arrest of the suspect or for a warrant to search the place where he 
made his home. The home, however, was not the suspect's abode and the 
occupier inquired if there was a warrant issued for the search. He 
was told: "You know better than to ask a stupid fucking question like 
that" and the search was conducted without success. Neither the 
suspect nor any evidence connected with the robberies was found. 
However, the search was not fruitless. The accused Phillips, alias 
Ward, was encountered as a house guest. Two sets of car keys were 
found on him. These keys were for cars parked in front of the house 
which displayed incorrect plates and were in fact stolen vehicles. 
Phillips was charged accordingly and at trial the admissibility of the 
finding of the keys and the cars became the subject of a voir dire. 
Defence counsel argued that the search was so unreasonable and \llllaw-
ful that acceptance of the evidence thereby obtained would bring the 
administration of justice in disrepute. 
The County Court Judge said that to determine if the administration of 
justice would be brought in disrepute he had to pose and answer the 
following questions: 
1. Would, considering all the circumstances (including the breach of 
social values, the gravity of the alleged offence, the effect of 
the exclusion of the evidence on the proceedings), the actions 
complained of in this case bring the administration of justice in 
disrepute in the eyes of the community at large?; and 
2. Would the community at large be shocked by the actions of police 
and the Court's acceptance of the fruits of their illegal 
actions? 
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In answering both questions in the affirmative, the Court summed up 
the lack of grounds to conduct a search. The judge said that although 
no force was used "... the rights and liberties of the individuals 
.were nevertheless seriously infringed". He complimented police for 
their good investigative work in this case and said to have the great-
est respect for their difficult task, "But it must not be forgotten 
that in a free society the police must work within the framework of 
the law, if they themselves are to enforce that law". In conclusion 
the Court held: 
"Certainly in the circumstances of this case, it would be 
dangerous indeed to hold that private rights of an indiv-
idual to the exclusive enjoyment of his person and 
property are to be subject to the invasion by police 
officers whenever they can be said to be acting in the 
furtherance of the enforcement of the criminal law, 
although they are not armed with any authority to justify 
their actions". 
Evidence excluded. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS ARD FREEDOMS 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH - EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
cRegina v. Rex, County Court of Vancouver, Vancouver Registry C830263 
July 1983 
A police informer told a constable that the accused had handguns and 
chemicals for the purpose of making explosives and that they were in 
the accused's locker at a Regional College. A search warrant was 
executed in the accused's absence but nothing of the above description 
was found in the locker. When the constable had time some time later 
again to get back to this investigation he learned that there were 
warrants outstanding for the accused in regards to charges of posses-
sion of marihuana. He attended at the house where the accused lived. 
This place was described as a communal home for a number of persons. 
All had a private bedroom but shared the kitchen, bathroom and living 
room. The accused and another person who resided in the house were 
found in the living room. The accused was placed under arrest for the 
warrants (which they did not have in their possession) and he and the 
other resident were asked "... you don't mind if we have a look 
around?" to which the 'other resident' answered: "Well, I guess 
not". Nothing of importance was found in the 1i ving room but police 
destroyed a plant they believed to be marihuana. When this happened 
the accused and the co-habitant inquired if police had a search 
warrant and indicated that they wanted the search to cease. The offi-
cers responded that it was too late to withdraw the consent they were 
given to search and they continued their examination of the house. 
The police also found some chemicals the accused claimed to use for 
"model rocketry". These chemicals became the basis for a charge. 
During the trial a voir dire was conducted to determine if the search 
was reasonable and, if not, whether the chemicals thereby found could 
be admitted in evidence or had to be excluded as such admission would 
bring the administration of justice in disrepute. 
Although police did not have to have the arrest warrants in their 
possession to ef feet the arrest the reason for not having them right 
there did apparently not impress the judge. It seems that he saw some 
trend of indifference to following the legally prescribed procedures. 
The arrest warrants were available in the municipal! ty in which the 
search was conducted but the constable had claimed that he just had 
been too busy to pick them up while he was assisted by officers of 
that municipality. Neither was there an explanation given why no 
search warrant was obtained for the search of the house. 
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The Court did not hestitate to find that the ". search of a sub-
ject's dwelling house, without a search warrant and under guise of 
effecting an arrest warrant, constitutes unreasonable search". 
It is lawful to search a person and the immediate surroundings when an 
arrest is effected. This is provided at common law to prevent access 
to weapons or the destruction of evidence. 
When the officers received consent to search the most protected place 
(a dwelling - a man's castle) it was perhaps alright to search 
although the practice was questionable under the circumstances. How-
ever, the legality of that part of the search was academic as the 
chemicals were found after the consent was withdrawn. Furthermore the 
search allowed when effecting an arrest in constitutionally protected 
places does not include an "... invasion of a man's . privacy by a top 
to bottom search of his house ••• ". 
Section 101(2) of the Criminal Code did not apply in this case 
either. The section provides for the search without warrant, but only 
where the situation is urgent and where there is potential danger 
which makes the obtaining of a warrant impractical. If the officers 
would have found contraband within plain view and considered a search 
of the premises, they should have secured the place while a warrant 
was obtained. 
The judge concluded that unreasonable search is synonymous to illegal 
search or seizure. 
To decide if the unreasonable search should result in the exclusion of 
the evidence thereby obtained, the Court reasoned that five factors 
had to be considered: 
1. Was the impropriety trivial or technical? 
2. Did the impropriety show a disregard for the legislation or of 
the apparent policy reflected therein? 
3. Was the impropriety a result of deliberate action on the part of 
the police, or did it arise as a result of their ignorance of the 
law or mistake in judgment? 
4. Other considerations were also included, such as the seriousness 
of the offence and the significance of the evidence sought to be 
excluded. 
5. Was the degree of the impropriety such a breach of social values 
and such a misconduct that it would shock the community. 
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The Court concluded that the attendance at the house was not solely to 
arrest the accused but predominantly to search the home and the offi-
cers knew they needed a search warrant for · that purpose. Furthermore 
the search was conducted at night for which special consent is 
required included in the requisite warrant. 
The circumstances exposed that the procedure followed was 'convenient 
expedience' to circumvent the required scrutiny by a justice of the 
peace. 
The crime alleged against the accused carries a penalty of 5 years and 
the gravity of the offence is in the 'lower middle range'. The grav-
ity of the impropriety in respect to the search outweighs the offence 
the accused allegedly committed, the Court seems to have concluded. 
The aggregate of all this caused the Court to conclude that "an ordin-
ary right thinking citizen of the community would be shocked "by the 
improprieties committed by police. Admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice in disrepute. 
The chemicals were ruled to be inadmissible 
in evidence. 
* * * * * 
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TID-BIT 
RECENT POSSESSION & THE CHARTER 
Ten days after a break and entry of a store the accused was found in 
unexplained possession of all the goods stolen (value $6,800). The 
doctrine of recent possession (which gives the judge of the fact the 
right to infer that the accused had guilty knowledge) was applied and 
the accused convicted. 
The accused appealed claiming that the aged doctrine is now unconsti-
tutional in that it violates the presumption of evidence. Not so, 
responded the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. The doctrine is simply "a 
lofty way".for the jury or a judge to infer a fact when no explanation 
is forthcoming where one is due under the dictum that 
"There comes a time that a man is so surrounded by 
inculpatory circumstances that he either explains 
or stands condemned". 
Russell v. R. 32 C.R. (Jd) 307 Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
* * * * * 
